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I am troubled by this recent turn of events and concerned that the world’s 
reliance on Chinese rare earth materials, in combination with China’s apparent 
willingness to use this reliance for leverage in wider international affairs, poses 
a potential threat to American economic and national security interests.
US representative Ed markey (reuters 2010) 
The mantra in the US ever since the late 1990s has been that globalisation will 
make everybody rich. By being rich, they will all become democratic. By being 
democratic, they will all be peaceful. Well, globalisation is working in a some-
what different way. China is getting rich – and India is getting rich. But China’s 
not getting democratic. We’ve seen in the recent case of China embargoing the 
export of rare earths that it’s a kind of a mercantilist economy. The economy is 
being run for strategic purposes in ways that we didn’t anticipate.
Clyde Prestowitz, former US Trade negotiator (Korbin 2010)
Clearly China wants the core technologies. It’s a new kind of mercantilism.
(Blas et al. 2010)
Robert Looney is 
distinguished Professor, 
department of national Security 
Affairs, naval Postgraduate 
School
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On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with a Japanese 
Coast Guard vessel near a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea. 
The collision sparked a chain of events that dramatised China’s growing 
forcefulness with foreign powers. Without warning, the Chinese halted the 
export of rare earth elements (rEEs) to Japan. The realisation quickly set 
in that China had captured an rEE monopoly, controlling 95% of global 
rEE production, comprising a total of 17 metallic elements (Hurst 2010a). 
Although the captain of the Chinese fishing boat detained by Japan was 
eventually released, the episode raises questions about China’s willing-
ness to engage in economic tactics such as boycotts and trade sanctions 
to achieve political ends. Earlier in 2010, the Chinese had reduced rEE 
export quotas by 70% for the second half of the year. The result: the prices 
of several purified rare earths increased by up to 850%. The message to 
most users of rEEs was clear: seek out ways of becoming less dependent 
on China for this critical input (Gordon 2010). User concern over their 
potential vulnerability to Chinese supply manipulation was only height-
ened by a long-forgotten 1992 quote from deng Xiaoping: ‘The middle 
East has oil, China has rare earths’ (in Hurst 2010b).
The international furore over China’s grip on rare earth metals pro-
vides another illustration of two starkly different views of China; one 
view (mainly in the West) 
sees China as a bellig-
erent new world power 
enacting trade barriers 
and pursuing beggar-my-
neighbour policies; the 
other (mainly in China) 
sees China as a victim of international bullying from the era of plundering 
that followed the Opium Wars of the 19th century, which precipitated the 
collapse of the Chinese empire (Becker 2010). 
To shed light on the possible motive underlying China’s recent actions, 
the sections below address a series of questions: How did China become 
the world’s leading producer of rEEs? does China’s current 95% market 
share represent a true natural monopoly? Was this monopoly created by 
comparative advantage cost factors, or was it created for the purpose of 
increasing national power by advancing China’s transformation to a higher, 
innovative stage of development at the expense of other countries – a new 
New uses for rare earths seemingly 
appear daily as firms push into new 
areas of green energy and high-tech 
electronics, leading to increased 
concerns over the adequacy of future 
supplies of these metals.
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technocratic mercantilism? A statistical analysis of the Chinese economy’s 
progress to higher levels of competitiveness suggests that the middle 
nation is lagging in one key component: technological readiness. That 
fact, together with China’s recent rare earth actions, suggests that a new 
form of mercantilism may be emerging in that country.
Rare earths: overview
Why have rare earths taken on such importance? For one thing, the 
number of applications for rEEs alone, or in alloys, is rapidly growing 
(Table 1). A few examples illustrate their growing importance. Of criti-
cal importance for many high-tech devices, high-strength rEE magnets 
facilitate miniaturisation of components for use in computers, com-
munications systems and state-of-the-art military equipment (moran 
2010a, p. 41). Europium, one rEE, is used in liquid-crystal displays 
while many rare earths are increasingly used in new technologies such 
Table 1: Rare Earth Elements: Selected End Uses
Light Rare Earths Major End Use Heavy Rare Earth Major End Use





Cerium autocatalyst, Dysprosium permanentmagnets
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as electric cars. It has been estimated that a Toyota Prius uses 25 lb of 
rEEs (Livergood 2010). new uses for rare earths seemingly appear daily 
as firms push into new areas of green energy and high-tech electronics, 
leading to increased concerns over the adequacy of future supplies of 
these metals (CrS 2010). 
China’s rise to dominance
Yet, despite their name, rare earths are, at least in the physical sense, not all 
that rare. All 17 rare earth elements are more abundant in the earth’s crust 
than gold, and some of them are as abundant as lead. However, these ele-
ments are scarce in that they are not found in highly concentrated deposits 
like gold and lead. Even the best rEE ores have very low concentrations. 
On the other hand, such ores occur relatively widely (Table 2). Significant 
deposits occur in India, Brazil, South Africa and the United States. The 
mountain Pass mine in California was one of the largest producers until 
it was shut down in the late 1990s because of environmental concerns 
(dolan 2010). With the recent price escalation, increased exploration indi-
cates that Canada, russia and Vietnam hold promise as potential sources 
of the key rEE elements.
China’s dominant market share can be attributed to a combination of 
factors. First, the country does have rich ore deposits, but not excep-
tional by world standards. Second, low labour costs have clearly helped 
make China’s exports extremely competitive in international markets. 
A third contributing factor has been China’s rather lax environmental 
standards. The mining and processing of rEEs produce large quantities 
of toxic waste, some of which can be radioactive. Up until the last few 
years, the Chinese authorities were unwilling to regulate the environ-
mental devastation caused by primitive, often illegal, but low-cost small-
scale mines. At the same time, increased environmental concerns and 
regulations were a major factor in the suspension of many rare earth min-
ing operations outside of China. Specifically, environmental problems 
were a major factor leading to the closure of the mountain Pass mine 
in California, following an accident that allowed a significant amount of 
radioactive waste to leak into the environment. Already facing low-cost 
Chinese competition, the mine closed rather than undertake the invest-
ment required to meet stiffer US and California regulations (richardson 
2010).
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Low-cost labour and low environmental standards contributed to 
China entering world markets with significantly lower-priced rare earths, 
but a fourth factor, the government’s overall development strategy, 
played a critical role. China’s development strategy in recent decades 
has been orientated towards massive state-supported investments (ImF 
2010), averaging between 15 and 20% of GdP (and reaching 60% of 
GdP during the 2009 stimulus package), designed to create as many 
jobs as possible. 
The Communist Party legitimises its rule in terms of providing employ-
ment to a growing labour force as well as increasing the population’s stand-
ard of living. In implementing this strategy, the country’s state-run banks 
are often under pressure from the authorities to extend credit to projects 
that would usually be considered unprofitable by western accounting 
standards. In practice, China’s rare earth industry (along with other broad 
segments of the economy) received large levels of subsidised loans in the 
mid-1980s. At the same time, local governments obtained more flexibility 
in encouraging growth (Stratfor 2010). These local authorities also found 
numerous ways of subsidising investment and productive expansion in 
their districts. 
Corruption has been a major problem, with local officials often issuing 
illegal permits and receiving kick-backs from companies receiving subsi-
dies. The result was a proliferation of small mining concerns specialising 
in the various rare earth minerals (Buckley 2010). This led to a spectacu-
lar increase in rare earth pro-
duction, with rates of output 
increasing by an annual rate 
of 40% in the 1980s and then 
doubling in the 1990s (EIU 
2003).
Since the domestic econ-
omy did not have the technol-
ogy (outside of magnets) to absorb this surge in production, most of the 
output was exported. The result was the suppression of world prices for 
most rare earths, while Chinese rare earth firms were unprofitable by nor-
mal accounting standards. In turn, the depressed world prices and higher 
environmental standards in the rest of the world resulted in the closure of 
most mines outside of China (Hook 2010).
China’s cutback in supplies during 
2010 sent market prices soaring – 
Neodymium jumped from US$41 
per kilogram in April to US$92 in 
October and Cerium oxide from 
US$4.70 to US$36 per kilo.
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Low-priced rare earths have resulted in an increase in traditional and 
new uses. many of the high-tech products in wide use are a result of an 
excessively cheap, abundant supply of Chinese rare earths. The result: 
China has acquired a strategic quasi-monopoly position in many of these 
critical elements. In the short term, this market power is also supported 
by the limited substitution of other metals for many of the rare earths 
– firms simply cannot easily substitute nickel for the neodymium in a 
magnet and expect it to have the same quality and properties: ‘Given 
highly inelastic short-term supply and demand, it is not surprising that 
China’s cutback in supplies during 2010 sent market prices soaring – 
neodymium jumped from US$41 per kilogram in April to US$92 in 
October and Cerium oxide from US$4.70 to US$36 per kilo over the 
same period’ (dolan 2010).
A Chinese monopoly?
In the long term, supply curves are always more elastic. Still, the prospects 
for increasing supplies may not be as easy as in many industries. Higher 
profitability of rare earths will certainly attract capital to the industry – 
however, meeting environmental requirements, obtaining permits and 
putting in the extensive infrastructure needed for high-volume produc-
tion present a number of expensive and time-consuming obstacles. The 
political uncertainties associated with these steps will discourage some 
potential new supplies from being brought online. Another critical uncer-
tainty concerns Chinese intentions – will the Chinese government flood 
the world markets every time investment starts flowing into potential new 
supplies? Can companies make any realistic forecast of future rare earth 
world prices for their rate of return analysis?
There are other issues that complicate an increase in rare earth produc-
tion outside of China. many countries are revising and updating their 
mining laws. The US may repeal the federal mining law dating to 1872. 
Existing legislation gives favourable treatment to mining companies. If 
passed into legislation, initiatives such as the proposed Hardrock mining 
and reclamation Act, introduced in 2007, would drastically constrain min-
eral companies and increase their production costs. In Australia, discussion 
of a possible ‘super tax’ has only further contributed to the uncertainty of 
existing mining operations such as the Lynas Corporation’s mount Weld 
rare earths project. Future ventures are even more in doubt. While the 
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government has retreated from a 40% tax on mining profits, fear remains 
that future governments may decide to implement something similar 
(Stratfor 2010).
Processing and refining rare earth ores presents another major obstacle 
to increasing production outside China. A complex procedure known 
as beneficiation is required to separate the chemically similar rare earth 
metals from the original ore. This process involves a complex chemical 
treatment, often varying considerably from mining site to mining site, 
depending on the composition of ores and rare earth mineral content. 
Lack of standardisation in processing leads to an additional and often size-
able cost. 
Unfortunately, along with the decline in rare earth prices and produc-
tion outside China, there has been little effort devoted to improving tech-
nologies to reduce the costs involved in processing and refining ores. most 
of the existing technologies are at least 30 years old. The newer technolo-
gies have for the most part all been developed in China. Uncertainty over 
Chinese willingness to license this technology adds an additional impedi-
ment to new rare earth ventures.
Given the many obstacles to expanded rare earth production outside 
China, most industry analysts feel that it will take at least a decade, or 
even longer, for a significant supply chain of mining, refining and process-
ing of rare earths to be put in place.
In sum, China has a large market share, but no natural monopoly. 
However, because of its control of supplies in the short term and the long 
lead times of increasing production outside the country, China may be 
able to preserve its dominant share if it chooses to do so. In addition to 
possessing unique knowledge of the industry, China could create great 
uncertainty over the profitability of future ventures outside the country. 
Just knowing that China could flood the market and force down the price 
at any time would discourage many smaller producers. As for larger poten-
tial producers, China could always convey a willingness to adopt ‘limit 
pricing’, a classic entry-deterring tactic that involves holding prices high 
enough to give moderate but steady profits, while still low enough to dis-
courage the growth of competition. 
In a major study of rare earths, the OECd arrived at a similar set of 
factors adding to the costs of production outside of China, as Korinek and 
Kim (2010) observe:
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• process technology is specific to each ore body
• high capital cost – typically more than US$d30,000 per ton of annual 
separated capacity
• marketing is customer specific – rare earths are not traded on any rec-
ognised exchange
• limited operational expertise outside China
• industry is dominated by China, where input costs are low.
It is possible to conclude that China’s rare earth monopoly was inad-
vertent and not part of a grand design to control this strategic group of 
elements. The over-investment in the industry was not something unique 
to the rare earth branch of the economy. Instead, it was the product of a 
general development strategy of job creation the country was applying at 
the time on a broad scale across many industries for the purpose of job cre-
ation. This may be changing as China realises the potential of its position. 
recently China has begun limiting output from many of the country’s 
small, unregulated mining operations. many of these companies are in the 
process of being merged into large, state-controlled enterprises, in effect 
enabling the Chinese to assume greater control of operations and better 
control the amount of rEEs flowing out of the country. In another policy 
shift, the Chinese are attempting to move as much as possible from simply 
exporting crude ores. Their goal is to create a supply chain whereby rEEs 
are increasingly used as critical components in a number of new high-tech 
industries (Homby 2010). Because of the difficulties and uncertainties 
in bringing new supplies online, even the resulting rising world prices 
might not perform its usual function of stimulating significant amounts of 
increased production.
These developments have been cast in an ominous light by outside 
experts: ‘Last year the Chinese announced their regular five year plan, 
looking ahead to 2010 to 2015. They said they would continue to reduce 
the export of these materials to the West and that they were consider-
ing stopping the export of certain of them’ (Lofton 2009); ‘The Chinese 
motives are pretty clear. They want Western users to do their manufactur-
ing in China and they need supplies for their own ambitious wind energy 
program’ (Heap 2010). 
Variants of this view see Chinese actions in the rare earth area as part 
of the country’s overall development strategy: ‘A strategy not necessar-
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ily built along Western ideals of free trade and comparative advantage, 
but rather one built more on a new mercantilism – a form of economic 
nationalism, with foreign trade used to enhance the wealth and power of 
one country at the expense of others’ (Bowles 2008). The credibility given 
this view depends in part on the country’s current growth constraints. If 
recent Chinese policies in the rare earth area are addressing a major con-
straint limiting the country’s economic progress and continued prosperity 
then the mercantilist interpretation deserves a closer examination. If not, 
then there are no doubt better explanations for recent developments in 
the industry. 
Constraints on China’s economic advancement
A useful framework for beginning an examination of Chinese growth 
constraints has been developed by the World Economic Forum. Building 
on the work of Harvard’s michael Porter (2007), the World Economic 
Forum has been studying the competitiveness of nations for nearly three 
decades. As Xavier Sala-i-martin (2007) observes, ‘Since 1979, annual 
Global Competitiveness reports have examined the factors enabling 
national economies to achieve sustained economic growth and long-term 
prosperity. Over the years our reports have served as benchmarking tools 
for business leaders and policymakers to identify obstacles to improved 
competitiveness.’ 
Stages of growth
The key concept in the Forum’s (Schwab 2010) approach is its Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). The GCI is a broad-based and compre-
hensive index for measuring national competitiveness. As opposed to the 
Forum’s indices it takes into account macroeconomic as well as the core 
microeconomic foundations of national competitiveness. Using this index 
the Forum defines competitiveness as ‘the set of institutions, policies, 
and factors that determine the level of productivity and thus income of a 
country’.
The Forum’s approach assumes the GCI can be depicted by a weighted 
average of many different components ‘each of which reflects one aspect 
of the complex reality that we call competitiveness. We group all these 
components in 12 different pillars that we call the 12 pillars of com-
petitiveness’ (Schwab 2010). According to the WEF, the pillars involve: 
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(1) institutions; (2) infrastructure; (3) the macroeconomic environment; 
(4) health and primary education; (5) higher education and training; (6) 
goods market efficiency; (7) labour market efficiency; (8) financial market 
development; (9) technological readiness; (10) market size; (11) business 
sophistication; and (11) innovation.
Following Porter’s earlier work (2001) the Forum assumes that coun-
tries progress through three distinct stages: (1) factor driven; (2) invest-
ment driven; and (3) innovation driven. 
Through the use of regression analysis the Forum has found that 
certain pillars are more important at one stage than others. In particu-
lar: (1) basic requirements – institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
stability and health and primary education – are key in the factor-driven 
stage; (2) efficiency enhancers – higher education and training, goods 
market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market sophistica-
tion, technological readiness and market size – are relatively important 
for the efficiency-driven stage; and (3) innovations and sophistication 
factors – business sophistication and innovation – play a critical role in 
the innovation stage.
drawing on this framework, the Forum is able to classify countries 
into the three main groups noted above. Operationally, countries are 
assigned to stages of development based on two criteria: (1) the level of 
GdP per capita measured at market exchange rates – a proxy for wages 
(used by the WEF because internationally comparable data on wages 
are not available for all countries covered); and (2) the extent to which 
countries are factor driven as proxied by the share of exports of primary 
goods in total exports. 
Countries falling in between two of the three states are considered to 
be ‘in transition’. For these countries the weights of the key pillars change 
smoothly as a country develops, reflecting the smooth transition from one 
stage of development. ‘By introducing this type of transition between 
stages into the model – that is by placing increasingly more weight on 
those areas that are becoming more important for the country’s competi-
tiveness as the country develops – the index can gradually “penalise” those 
countries that are not preparing for the next stage’ (martin et al, 2007, p. 8). 
Table 3 provides a summary of the latest (2010) World Economic Forum 
stage classification of countries.
In its characterisation of China, the World Economic Forum notes that:
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Table 3: Countries at Various Stages of Development 2010–11
Stage 1 Transition Stage 2 Transition Stage 3
from 1 to 2 from 2 to 3
Bangladesh Algeria Albania Bahrain Australia
Benin Angola Argentina Barbados Austria
Bolivia Armenia Bosnia Chile Belgium
BurkinaFaso Azerbaijan Brazil Croatia Canada
Burundi Botswana Bulgaria Estonia Cyprus
Cambodia Brunei CapeVerde Hungary CzechRepublic
Cameroon Egypt China Latvia Denmark
Chad Georgia Colombia Lithuania Finland
Coted'Ivoire Guatemala CostaRica Oman France
Ethiopia Guyana DominicanRepublic Poland Germany
Gambia,The Indonesia Ecuador PuertoRico Greece
Ghana Iran,IslamicRep ElSalvador SlovakRepublic HongKongSAR
Honduras Jamaica Jordan Taiwan,China Iceland
India Kazakhstan Lebanon Trinidadand Ireland
Kenya Kuwait Macedonia Tobago Israel
KyrgyzRepublic Libya Malaysia Uruguay Italy
Lesotho Morocco Mauritius Japan
Madagascar Paraguay Mexico Korea,Rep
Malawi Qatar Montenegro Luxembourg
Mali SaudiArabia Namibia Malta
Mauritania SriLanka Panama Netherlands
Moldova Swaziland Peru NewZealand
Mongolia Syria Romania Norway
Mozambique Ukraine RussianFederation Portugal















EconomicCrisis',inKlausSchwabed.,The Global Competitiveness Report: 2010–2011(Geneva,World
EconomicForum,2010),p.11.
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China’s performance remains stable in most areas with its main strengths its 
large and growing market size, macroeconomic stability, and relatively sophis-
ticated and innovative businesses, however technological readiness is another 
area where China has traditionally underperformed (78th out of 139 coun-
tries, ranking behind Guatemala at 67th and Albania at 72nd). Other areas for 
improvement are related to its human resources base. China has made small 
strides in the quality of higher education and training (60th, again out of 139 
countries, following Jordan at 57th and montenegro at 52nd), but there remains 
considerable room for improvement in what constitutes an important area going 
forward.
In addition, although its labour market is reasonably efficient, China 
scores quite low in rigidity of employment: 78th out of 139 countries 
(following Bangladesh and Burundi tied at 71st), which constitutes a 
major challenge. On this basis, China is classified as a Group 3 Country 
(Table 3).
Growth constraints
The framework outlined above provides a useful platform for examining 
the constraints to national economic progress – moving through the stages 
to ultimately arrive at stage 3 (group 5). China is classified by the WEF 
as being a stage 2 (group 3) country – efficiency driven.  For the purposes 
at hand there are identifiable constraints that may be preventing the 
country from moving to stage 3 (group 5), and if so what are they and are 
these somehow being addressed by the country’s economic leaders in the 
Communist Party in part by the country’s rare earth policies? 
In addition to any of the 12 pillars that might be possible constraints 
on Chinese growth, the development literature suggests that growth 
may also be affected by more ‘deeper determinants’ of growth (rodrik 
& rosenzweig 2009). These include governance variables such as cor-
ruption, political stability and the rule of law. Another body of literature 
suggests that the various dimensions of economic freedom have had a 
profound effect on the progress (or lack of) observed in many countries. 
Governance
Perhaps because of the breakdown in governance producing failed states 
in many parts of the world, this variable is receiving increased attention in 
explaining the growth and advancement of economies. While the ranking 
of countries on the basis of their relative progress in attaining improved 
governance is inherently subjective (Kaufman, Kraay & mastruzzi 2010), 
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Quality Rule of Law
Control of 
Corruption
1 Mean –0.547 –0.685 –0.714 –0.562 –0.761 –0.731
Numberof
Countries
38 38 38 37 30 38
Std.
Deviation
0.557 0.813 0.389 0.443 0.461 0.388
2 Mean –0.739 –0.300 –0.267 –0.278 –0.415 –0.402
Numberof
Countries
25 25 25 25 22 25
Std.
Deviation
0.649 0.787 0.582 0.710 0.552 0.723
3 Mean 0.015 –0.175 0.061 0.137 –0.223 –0.165
Numberof
Countries
29 29 29 29 23 29
Std.
Deviation
0.620 0.666 0.412 0.453 0.545 0.442
4 Mean 0.657 0.598 0.802 0.902 0.720 0.572
Numberof
Countries
15 15 15 15 13 15
Std.
Deviation
0.680 0.320 0.303 0.331 0.378 0.456
5 Mean 1.127 0.761 1.462 1.358 1.443 1.488
Numberof
Countries
32 32 32 32 28 32
Std.
Deviation
0.547 0.558 0.430 0.350 0.454 0.661
Total Mean 0.051 –0.038 0.183 0.240 0.109 0.097
Numberof
Countries
139 139 139 138 116 139
Std.
Deviation
0.932 0.882 0.932 0.886 0.989 1.006
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the World Bank (2010) regularly provides a set of rankings incorporating 
the full extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon.
more precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of 
six dimensions of governance covering 213 economies over the period 
1996–2009: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability and absence 
of violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule 
of law; and (6) control of corruption. The values for the governance figures 
range from –2.5 (lowest level) to +2.5, the highest level, with a country 
sample mean of zero.
The five stage group means (for 2009 values) on each governance 
dimension (Table 4) show a fairly steady progression from extremely low 
levels of governance in stage 1 to high levels for those countries in stage 
5. The one notable exception is the drop in the voice and accountability 
dimension as countries move from stage 1 to stage 2.
In China’s case, the country scores low relative to Group 3 countries 
on several governance dimensions: -1.65 voice and accountability (vs 0.02 
Group 3); -0.20 regulatory quality (vs 0.14 Group 3); -0.44 political stability 
(vs -0.18 Group 3 countries); -0.35 rule of law (vs -0.22 Group 3); and -0.53 
control of corruption (vs -0.17 for Group 3 countries). However, China did 
show more progress in government effectiveness, 0.12 (vs 0.02 Group 3 
countries). Clearly, lack of progress in the governance area is a potential 
constraint on Chinese growth and movement to a higher stage of develop-
ment.
Economic freedom
Both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic 
Freedom (miller & Holmes 2010) and the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (Gwartney, Hall & Lawson 2010) provide good 
measures of the relative progress made by countries in moving to a 
deregulated, limited-government, free-market environment. Because the 
Heritage Foundation data set has a larger sample of countries, it was used 
for the analysis that follows. The Heritage Index reflects the absence 
of government constraint or coercion on the production, distribution or 
consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic 
freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. 
To measure economic freedom, the Heritage Index takes ten different 
factors into account: (1) trade policy; (2) fiscal burden of government; (3) 
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government intervention in the economy; (4) monetary policy; (5) banking 
and finance; (6) capital flows and foreign investment; (7) wages and prices; 
(8) property rights; (9) regulation; and (10) the informal market.
The index provides a framework for understanding potential constraints on 
growth and development: how open countries are to competition; the degree 
of state intervention in the economy whether through taxation, spending, or 
overregulation, and the strength and independence of a country’s judiciary to 
enforce rules and protect private property. Some countries may have freedom 
in all factors; others may have freedom in just a few. One of the most important 
findings of research carried out using the index is that economic freedom is 
required in all aspects of economic life.
(Eiras 2003)
That is, countries must score well in all ten of the factors in order to 
improve their economic efficiency and consequently the living standards 
of their people.
The latest Heritage Foundation ranking (2010) notes that ‘China’s 
economic freedom score is 51, making its economy the 140th freest in the 
2010 Index. Its overall score is 2.2 points lower than the previous year, 
with significant declines recorded in investment freedom and labor free-
dom. China is ranked 31st out of 41 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and its overall score is lower than the global and regional averages.’
Although experiencing major economic reforms throughout the 1980s 
and into the 1990s, China’s transition to greater economic freedom has 
been sluggish over the life of the Index (1995–2010). Efforts to embrace 
market principles have been made from time to time, but overall progress 
has been modest. rapid development of coastal cities has resulted in 
increasing disparities in economic freedom and standards of living across 
the country. Foreign investment is controlled and regulated, and the judi-
cial system is highly vulnerable to political influence. The state maintains 
tight control of the financial sector, and directly or indirectly owns all 
banks. All of these factors represent potential constraints on the country’s 
future economic progress.
An examination of the group means (Tables 5 and 6) by World Economic 
Forum grouping shows a pattern similar to that found in the governance 
dimensions – steady progress as one moves from Group 1 to Group 5. The 
one major exemption is in the fiscal area, where lower levels of govern-
ment spending and taxes are considered freer. Given the expansion of 
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Table 5: Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions I, World 
















1 Mean 54.300 55.460 69.537 77.051 75.168 69.886
Numberof
Countries
38 38 38 37 37 37
Std.
Deviation
5.867 11.605 7.503 9.418 15.816 5.591
2 Mean 57.260 65.150 74.792 82.204 71.667 66.329
Numberof
Countries
24 24 24 24 24 24
Std.
Deviation
9.639 16.136 10.320 11.229 15.905 7.024
3 Mean 61.890 67.110 78.090 80.517 71.893 71.928
Numberof
Countries
29 29 29 29 29 29
Std.
Deviation
6.263 9.410 7.970 7.884 16.450 4.942
4 Mean 68.910 72.550 84.136 80.693 63.229 72.879
Numberof
Countries
14 14 14 14 14 14
Std.
Deviation
4.936 9.822 7.166 9.408 17.512 4.184
5 Mean 73.190 85.470 86.391 64.234 49.128 78.613
Numberof
Countries
32 32 32 32 32 32
Std.
Deviation
6.899 10.272 3.562 14.439 19.451 3.810
Total Mean 62.330 68.380 77.696 76.059 66.496 72.055
Numberof
Countries
137 137 137 138 136 138
Std.
Deviation
10.057 15.860 9.818 12.693 19.661 6.649
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Table 6: Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions II, World 













1 Mean 41.180 43.290 30.210 27.010 57.600
Numberof
Countries
38 38 38 37 37
Std.
Deviation
14.861 12.318 8.918 6.482 14.868
2 Mean 45.430 43.750 35.220 31.000 60.429
Numberof
Countries
23 24 23 24 24
Std.
Deviation
22.508 16.101 14.498 11.425 19.769
3 Mean 54.310 53.450 40.170 38.140 63.403
Numberof
Countries
29 29 29 29 29
Std.
Deviation
16.568 12.328 13.462 8.855 12.870
4 Mean 68.570 63.570 62.500 54.500 66.621
Numberof
Countries
14 14 14 14 14
Std.
Deviation
11.673 13.927 13.552 10.559 15.062
5 Mean 75.310 70.630 80.940 74.530 66.678
Numberof
Countries
32 32 32 32 32
Std.
Deviation
12.885 12.165 12.472 14.213 18.589
Total Mean 55.550 53.980 48.440 43.970 62.366
Numberof
Countries
136 137 136 137 137
Std.
Deviation
20.911 17.141 23.577 21.328 16.561
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Table 7: Factor Analysis, Competitiveness, Governance and Economic Freedom 
Components
Source  Variable  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
GCI BusinessSophistication 0.737* 0.365 0.300 0.324 0.190
GCI MarketSize 0.835* 0.009 –0.146 0.036 0.087
GCI Innovation 0.688* 0.338 0.331 0.423 0.095
GCI MacroeconomicEnvironment 0.675* 0.111 0.141 –0.111 0.162
GCI Infrastructure 0.662* 0.313 0.349 0.288 0.395
GCI HigherEducationandTraining 0.610* 0.267 0.282 0.345 0.525
GCI GoodsMarketEfficiency 0.576* 0.463 0.533 0.139 0.231
GCI TechnologicalReadiness 0.573* 0.423 0.335 0.366 0.409
GCI FinancialMarketDevelopment 0.570* 0.464 0.401 0.082 0.116
WBGI GovernmentEfficiency 0.512* 0.493 0.416 0.407 0.337
EF MonetaryFreedom 0.284 0.792* –0.011 0.179 –0.096
EF InvestmentFreedom 0.038 0.791* 0.231 0.117 0.370
EF FinancialFreedomFIF10 0.111 0.737* 0.283 0.119 0.412
EF OverallFreedomScore 0.307 0.686* 0.525 –0.009 0.375
WBGI RegulatoryQuality 0.411 0.635* 0.367 0.272 0.424
WBGI VoiceandAccountability 0.188 0.599* 0.073 0.542 0.359
EF PropertyRights 0.391 0.598* 0.403 0.443 0.231
EF FreedomFromCorruption 0.449 0.535* 0.425 0.437 0.271
WBGI ControlOverCorruption 0.424 0.527* 0.441 0.455 0.274
WBGI RuleofLaw 0.451 0.485 0.415 0.464 0.332
EF BusinessFreedom 0.290 0.452 0.417 0.183 0.432
EF LaborFreedom –0.018 0.040 0.833* –0.113 0.115
GCI LaborMarketEfficiency 0.231 0.283 0.785* 0.095 0.117
GCI Institutions 0.510 0.371 0.598* 0.333 0.145
EF FiscalFreedom –0.144 –0.255 0.113 –0.832* 0.242
EF GovernmentSpending 0.043 0.002 –0.029 –0.824* –0.385
EF TradeFreedom 0.291 0.332 0.146 0.033 0.757*
GCI HealthandPrimaryEducation 0.556 0.224 0.159 0.162 0.621*
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Table 8: BRIC Country Factor Scores
Country Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Brazil 0.677 –0.348 –0.903 0.912 –0.662
China 2.913 –1.909 –0.271 –0.573 –1.394
India 1.507 –0.798 –0.510 0.103 –1.608
RussianFederation 0.973 –2.366 –0.314 –0.040 0.278
Notes:Onthetwodominantdimensionsinthedata,ChinascoresespeciallyhighonFactor1,the
competitivenessdimension,butfallsquitelowontheeconomicfreedomdimension(Factor2).
government spending in the advanced countries, Groups 4 and 5 score low 
on this dimension.
China scores below the Group 3 mean on all of the economic freedom 
components, with the major shortfalls in business freedom (50, vs Group 
3 mean of 67.1), investment freedom (20, vs Group 3 mean of 54.3), finan-
cial freedom (30, vs Group 3 mean of 53.5), property rights (20, vs Group 
3 mean of 40.2).
Constraint analysis
Three data sets commonly used in the analysis of economic growth 
and progress were merged: (1) the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitive Index: measuring the Productive Potential of nations 
(Schwab 2010); (2) the World Bank (2010) Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (1996–2009); and (3) the Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom (miller & Holmes 2010).
The first step in the analysis was to assess the main trends in the data 
as well as confirm the general picture of China’s progress obtained from 
the previous discussion of the three databases. The key questions are: 
(1) ‘Of the 24 variables contained in the merged data set, how many dis-
tinct phenomena were represented?’ and (2) ‘What was China’s relative 
attainment on these key dimensions?’ For this purpose a factor analysis 
was undertaken. The rotated factor matrix (Table 7) produced five main 
trends or dimensions: Factor 1, a competitiveness dimension; Factor 2, 
economic freedom dimension; Factor 3, labour market freedom/efficiency 
dimension; Factor 4, government spending, fiscal dimension; and Factor 
5, trade freedom dimension.
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An examination of the country factor scores (Table 8) on each of the 
main dimensions shows that the BrIC countries (Brazil, russia, India and 
China) exhibit some fundamental differences in their strengths and weak-
nesses on each dimension. Of the two most important dimensions, China 
scored exceptionally high on Factor 1, the competitiveness dimension, 
and rather poorly on Factor 2, the economic freedom dimension. 
The next step in the analysis was to determine the sharpness of the 
World Economic Forum stages. Specifically, could a limited number of 
variables, such as those used in the factor analysis, produce a profile that 
correctly placed a high number of countries in the five WEF groupings 
shown in Table 3? In other words, are there a limited number of key fac-
tors whose increased value would be sufficient to move a country up to a 
higher state of development? Similarly, would a deficiency in a key vari-
able limit progress through the various groupings?
For this purpose a discriminant analysis was undertaken. This tech-
nique is commonly used in profiling (i.e. it identifies those characteristics 
or attributes that are statistically significant in placing, with a high degree 
of probability, entities – in this case countries – in distinct groupings). 
An advantage of the analysis is that it is capable of identifying critical 
values of the placement variables to move (again in this case) countries 
to higher groupings. As applied, the analysis entered variables from the 
combined data set one at a time until there were no longer any statically 
significant improvements in the country group delineation. Of the 24 vari-
ables, only four were statistically significant in profiling the five groups 
(see Appendix, Table A-1). In their order of importance: (1) technological 
readiness (WEF); rule of law (World Bank); infrastructure (WEF); and 
innovation (WEF). These four variables were sufficiently pervasive to 







Probability of Group Placement
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Brazil 3 3 0.001 0.068 0.864 0.065 0.001
China 3 2 0.062 0.837 0.095 0.006 0.000
India 1 1 0.608 0.260 0.131 0.001 0.000
RussianFederation 3 2 0.004 0.650 0.325 0.021 0.000
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be able to correctly classify 75% of the WEF sample of countries (see 
Appendix, Table A-2). 
The discriminant analysis suggests that China may not possess suf-
ficient levels of the four key discriminating variables; the discriminant 
analysis (Table 9) placed China in Group 2 with a 83.7% chance of correct 
placement. Its chance of being a Group 2 country was only 9.5%. Another 
BrIC country, russia, was also classified as a Group 2 country (down from 
the WEF placement in Group 
3). In russia’s case, the discrimi-
nant analysis placed the country 
in Group 2 with a 65% chance of 
correct placement, with and only 
a 33% chance of placement in 
Group 2.
Of the BrIC countries, China 
and russia were reclassified from 
Group 3 to Group 2 by the discri-
minant model. Looking at the group means (see Appendix, Table A-3), 
China and russia were placed in Group 2 largely because of fairly large 
deficiencies in a key area. In China’s case, the country ranked 78th in 
technological readiness, the most important group discriminating variable. 
The mean on this variable for Group 3 was 66.7. In russia’s case, the coun-
try’s rule of law score, the second most important discriminating variable 
at -0.77, was considerably below the Group 3 mean of -0.30. These are the 
key areas for both countries to immediately focus on in their attempts to 
move through the stages of development. 
The results suggest that, despite the fact of China’s impressive progress 
in achieving major gains in most of the key areas of competitiveness, the 
country’s focus now needs to shift from areas such as infrastructure so as 
to address a key deficiency: technological readiness. Without this shift, the 
country’s progress up the development stage ladder will be constrained 
due to diminished returns for the key elements of its recent development 
strategy. 
A related situation appears to be taking place in russia, with the coun-
try’s progress being constrained by diminishing returns stemming from a 
lack of progress in a key governance area: the rule of law. Until the country 
makes significant progress in this area, efforts towards growth through the 
Despite China’s rapid 
rates of growth and 
significant improvements in 
competitiveness over the last 
several decades, the economy 
appears unbalanced to the 
extent that future growth 
and advancement may be in 
jeopardy.
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current modernisation strategy will not be sufficient to escape the govern-
ance trap into which the country appears to have fallen.
To summarise, despite China’s rapid rates of growth and significant 
improvements in competitiveness over the last several decades, the 
economy appears unbalanced to the extent that future growth and 
advancement may be in jeopardy. While most observers have focused on 
macroeconomic imbalances in the domestic and external accounts as key 
elements that must be adjusted for rapid growth to continue, the analysis 
here suggests a more subtle imbalance, the lag in the country’s techno-
logical readiness may possibly represent an even more serious obstacle to 
rapid job creation and economic progress. 
A new technocratic mercantilism?
The results of the analysis above are so striking that one can be certain the 
Chinese are well aware of the situation and are in the process of imple-
menting policies to overcome the problem. To make these adjustments, 
are the Chinese, in contrast to the strategic mercantilism of the 1990s 
(Wolf 1995), implementing a new sophisticated form of mercantilism? Is it 
a form of technocratic mercantilism whereby a series of government rules, 
regulations and policies are focused on speeding the country’s technologi-
cal readiness?
Because rare earths are a critical element in many high-tech products, 
such as green energy, electronics and a wide range of sophisticated military 
hardware, these are logical areas for China to eventually develop. However 
the country’s technological lag behind many competing countries means 
that China lacks the domestic capability to produce many of these high-
end products. As a result, inside the country the metals are used mainly for 
permanent magnetic materials (Becker 2010).
China’s export curbs on raw earths have drawn speculation that they are 
essentially a mercantilist tool to force foreign companies to move produc-
tion of sophisticated electronics to China. The blueprint for China’s next 
five-year economic plan focuses on how the country can move up the pro-
duction chain. Specifically, China’s export restrictions on rEEs and other 
minerals, which are used extensively in green technologies, significantly 
benefit Chinese manufacturers of alternative and renewable energy equip-
ment. As the US General Accounting Office notes: ‘The Chinese green 
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tech industry also benefits from numerous other central and local govern-
ment policies – from heavily subsidised land and low interest loans to local 
content requirements, currency undervaluation, and government procure-
ment rules favoring domestic companies. These government favors helped 
make China the global leader in manufacturing’ (GAO 2010).
Once in China, many of these companies may find that they are 
under severe pressure to transfer much of their proprietary technology to 
Chinese firms. For several years China has promoted ‘indigenous innova-
tion,’ polices to support domestically developed and owned technologies, 
as a way to move up the value chain (US-China Economic and Security 
review Commission (2010). 
Initially (starting around 2006) the regulations were only enforced on a local 
level, but in november 2009, Chinese ministries issued a national catalog of 
products that should be developed and given preference for government pro-
curements. In effect this policy shift if it stays in effect would require foreign 
companies doing business in the rare earth area to transfer technology and 
ownership to a Chinese company, and even then they may not qualify for the 
national catalogue of products.
(US-China Business Council Staff 2010)
Hedlund and Atkinson (2007) found many similar practices in the 
Chinese IT sector and have summarised (see Table 10) a range of policies 
they consider mercantilist as opposed to a more innovative approach to 
technology. 
Table 10: Comparison of Innovative and Mercantilist Policies
















Sourde:ModifiedfromoriginalinJulieA.HedlundandRobertD.Atkinson, The Rise of the New Mercantilists: Unfair Trade Practices in the 
Innovation Economy,TheInformationTechnology&InnovationFoundation,June2007,Table1,p.5.
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Conclusions
Attempts to link China to simple or traditional mercantilist practices have 
not been completely convincing – other explanations often appear to fit 
the facts, and most often other explanations are found to provide better 
insights to Chinese actions. For example, those suggesting Chinese mer-
cantilist practices often cite the country’s large foreign exchange reserves, 
especially in dollar-denominated assets. Also noted is the large amount 
of foreign direct investment (FdI) going into China that rivals FdI into 
the US. The explanation: China’s rapid increase in foreign exchanges is 
simply a reflection of its mercantilist policy, exporting through creating 
a deliberately undervalued currency, cheap labour and foreign investors 
who are given special incentives to export. 
It should be noted that other researchers often come up with a different 
interpretation. Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin (2005), looking at the reasons 
behind China’s increased foreign exchange reserve and its success at attract-
ing FdI, conclude that they are too complex for a mercantilist explanation. 
They argue that the mercantilist explanation is an ‘intriguing story, but the 
facts do not support it’. In a similar vein, Theodore moran (2010b) finds 
that Chinese acquisitions of mineral and energy reserves outside China are 
for the most part simply expanding the world supply of these resources.
Looking at the Chinese economy from a more micro- and industry per-
spective, the analysis developed here, while not proving the existence of 
Chinese mercantilism, lends support to the argument. While the country 
may not have tried to create a rare earth monopoly, once it found itself in 
that position, it began, as many countries are currently attempting (Brittan 
2010), to exploit it along aggressive beggar-my-neighbour lines. A new 
technocratic mercantilism appears to be emerging whereby a series of 
policies appear to be designed to position the country for a spurt of growth 
thorough the WEF competitiveness groupings.
• First, by restricting exports, the country has been able to achieve a bet-
ter world price without necessarily threatening its monopoly, given the 
uncertainty created by China itself.
• Using access to rare earths, the country hopes to attract a wide spectrum 
of high-tech industries speeding up the transfer of technology to the 
industry – critical for eventually dominating many product lines.
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• Once the country’s rare earth monopoly was created, the pursuit of 
strategic trade (the new mercantilism of the 1990s) policies, such as 
subsidies to green energy technologies using rare earths, was assured a 
much higher degree of success.
The last two policies were perhaps implemented because of the coun-
try’s fear of a technological readiness gap that potentially might have 
reached a level severe enough to threaten the country’s ability to sustain 
rapid rates of economic growth, job creation and the advancement to a 
higher level of development. 
Why would China seek the development of a technocratic form of 
mercantilism rather than a more market-driven comparative advantage–
innovation approach? Perhaps given the serious technological gap, and its 
threat to continued growth and job creation, the Chinese leadership felt 
relying on market forces was overly risky and would not close the gap as 
rapidly as a more technocrat–authoritarian designed approach. 
Or it could be simply as long-time China observer robert Samuelson 
speculated: ‘The trouble is that China has never genuinely accepted the 
basic rules governing the world economy. China’s autarchic policies repre-
sent an extreme form of mercantilism, to be sure; but they are fundamen-
tally at odds with the principles of an open international trading system 
that China committed to when it elected to join the WTO.’
In either case, as minxim Pei (2010) observes, ‘we are entering a pro-
longed period of elevated tensions and more frequent disputes between 
China and the West – a “new normal” in geopolitics.’
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Table A-1: Discriminant Analysis Variable Selection
Step Wilks'Lambda
ExactF ApproximateF




0.158 1 4 110.0 146.261 4 110.0 0.000
2 RuleofLaw 0.118 2 4 110.0 51.953 8 218.0 0.000
3 Infrastructure 0.099 3 4 110.0 22.390 12 286.033 0.000
4 Innovation 0.086 4 4 110.0 26.288 16 327.528 0.000
Ateachstep,thevariablethatminimizestheoverallWilks'Lambdaisentered
Maximumnumberofstepsis36;MinimumpartialFtoenteris3.84;MaximumpartialFtoremoveis2.71




1 2 3 4 5 Total
Count
1 25 4 1 0 0 30
2 3 14 3 2 0 22
3 0 5 15 3 0 23
4 0 0 1 10 2 13
5 0 0 0 5 23 28
Percent
1 83.3 13.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 13.6 63.6 13.6 9.1 0.0 100.0
3 0.0 21.7 65.2 13.0 0.0 100.0
4 0.0 0.0 7.7 76.9 15.4 100.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 82.1 100.0
Note:75%oforiginalgroupedcasescorrectlyclassified
Appendix
74 WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 12 • no. 1 • January–march 2011 
Robert Looney







1 Mean –0.785 120.710 101.250 120.110
Numberof
Countries
28 28 28 28
Std.Deviation 0.465 13.075 28.922 14.364
2 Mean –0.487 94.520 94.390 79.170
Numberof
Countries
23 23 23 23
Std.Deviation 0.488 15.802 31.276 17.515
3 Mean –0.303 66.650 86.900 84.550
Numberof
Countries
20 20 20 20
Std.Deviation 0.479 13.425 29.207 16.321
4 Mean 0.638 41.650 51.550 39.250
Numberof
Countries
20 20 20 20
Std.Deviation 0.336 13.196 23.068 13.768
5 Mean 1.565 15.800 17.680 17.920
Numberof
Countries
25 25 25 25
Std.Deviation 0.313 9.866 11.870 12.114
Total Mean 0.109 69.960 70.840 69.900
Numberof
Countries
116 116 116 116
Std.Deviation 0.989 41.153 41.253 40.399
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